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Summary
In her recent, praised and prized paper, ‘The Coming Multi-Order World’, 
Trine Flockhart has argued that the current international system is moving to-
wards one consisting of several different orders ‘nested within an overall inter-
national system’. When he claimed something similar in his book World Or-
der, Henry Kissinger was labeled as a constructivist by some commentators. 
In Kissinger’s case, these changes are particularly consequential, given that 
they bring about the unprecedented danger of simultaneous breakup within 
and across the many orders of today’s world. The author’s intention here is 
twofold: on the one hand, to examine what are the changes in the very notion 
of international politics, given the transformation of classical concepts such as 
interests, identities, sovereignty, legitimacy, conflict and cooperation. On the 
other hand, and this is the central issue, to look for suitable theoretical frame-
works to successfully grasp the changing nature of international politics and 
the realities of the coming multi-order world. The presumed answer is that the 
nature of the incoming changes produces the need for more subtle and com-
plex, cross-over theories of international relations. As it is obvious from Kis-
singer’s example, traditional realist theory and social constructivism seem to 
converge irresistibly. In that sense, ‘hybrid’ theories such as Barkin’s realist 
constructivism and ‘liberal realism’ of the English School seem to be gaining 
on traditional grand theories in regard to their relevance and research potential.
Keywords: Constructivism, International Politics, International System, Mul-
tipolarity, Realism
Introduction
The issue of order has been one of the central elements of politics since its emer-
gence as a social phenomenon and as a scientific discipline.1 The modern, West-
1 This paper was developed within the project No. 179009, funded by the Ministry of Educa-
tion, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia. It is a revised version of 
the paper originally presented at the IAPSS World Congress at the Central European University, 
Budapest, on April 6, 2017.
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phalian notion of international politics is particularly oriented towards the issue of 
order: its emergence, transformations and sustaining. Sources of the order’s legiti-
macy or its material foundations have, naturally, been changing in accordance with 
historical forces that have shaped it, but the notion itself has never lost its signifi-
cance: perceived either as a goal, a state of affairs, or, within social sciences, an 
analytic tool. Occasional overuse of the concept has, at times, produced significant 
confusion regarding its meaning, scope or constitutive parts, but its paramount im-
portance in the context of conducting social relations or their systematic explaining 
and understanding has rarely been questioned.
The Cold War’s end, as a particularly turbulent moment in the modern history 
of international politics, was no exception in this regard. On the contrary, the 1980s 
brought about increasing interest in problems of what was correctly perceived as 
a dramatically changing global order. The hyper-production of articles, books and 
various comments on the nature of the coming transformations or the positions of 
the world’s two superpowers ensued, in academic and wider social circles alike. A 
famous debate on America’s position and supposed imminent decline in the context 
of imperial overstretching (Kennedy, 1987; Nye, 1990) at the onset of the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, set the stage for further disputes about perspectives of internation-
al order, the one between Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ and Huntington’s ‘clash of 
civilizations’ being perhaps the most intensive and far-reaching (Fukuyama, 1992; 
Huntington, 1996). President G. H. W. Bush announced the New World Order in 
1990 and for almost a decade thereafter, the ‘unipolar moment’ seemed like a sta-
ble condition of global politics. American primacy was regularly perceived as an 
almost unquestionable perspective and, by many U.S. authors, as an absolute stra-
tegic priority (Brzezinski, 1997). 
As international history has condensed at the turn of the century, with far-rang-
ing events occurring with increased dynamics, the global academic and policy com-
munity struggled to keep up with deep changes in global politics. The role of the 
United States of America is constantly being reassessed – given its position as the 
still dominant but gradually waning power (Kupchan, 2002; Mandelbaum, 2005), 
especially in the context of the post-9/11 global war on terror, as well as in the con-
text of a power shift to the East and elsewhere (Khanna, 2008) and what Fareed Za-
karia identified as ‘the rise of the rest’ (Zakaria, 2009). 
The second decade of the twenty-first century brought about not only further 
and more serious transformations in the nature of international order, but also a sig-
nificant change of discourse: what was previously claimed to be turbulence or the 
re-composition of the order, has increasingly been viewed as a crisis, breakdown, 
collapse, or ‘disarray’ (Ikenberry, 2011; Brzezinski, 2012; Mandelbaum, 2016; 
Bremmer, 2015; Emmott, 2017; Kirchick, 2017; Haass, 2017). This was, no doubt, 
Lišanin, M., Possibilities of Assessing the Changing Nature of International Politics...
145
predominantly in relation to the notion of the post-World War II ‘liberal world or-
der’, although it may very well be discussed whether such an order has ever been 
truly global (Kissinger, 2014). In 2016, the outcomes of the British EU member-
ship referendum and the U.S. presidential election marked the triumph of radical 
re-conceptualization of international politics, including issues such as the value of 
globalization, the role of international political, economic and security regimes, or 
the importance of identity politics. A distinctive direction assumed by some authors 
was based on the thesis that the global order, even before it collapsed, was dramati-
cally changed by becoming ungoverned, or unadministered: rather than the G-7 
or the G-20, it was ‘G-Zero’ that now (mis)managed ‘no one’s world’ (Bremmer, 
2012; Kupchan, 2012). 
It is evident that the IR literature has aspired to follow, as closely as possible, 
the transformations of the international system, as well as those within it. The cur-
rent state of affairs, regarding the changing world order, has caught the attention of 
much of the literature, especially as it becomes clear that as the order is changing, 
the instruments of its explanation and understanding must change also. What were 
before two irreconcilable approaches to the study of world politics – realism and 
constructivism – now seem to converge as international practices become too com-
plex to be analyzed one-sidedly. This paper draws upon Trine Flockhart’s notion 
of the ‘coming multi-order world’ (Flockhart, 2016) in the endeavor to outline the 
emergence, or re-emergence, of hybrid theoretical frameworks, particularly suitable 
for the analysis of this phenomenon.
After the introductory section, the paper is divided into three main parts. In the 
first one, some basic concepts of international systems and orders are outlined. The 
second part deals with the supposed collapse of international order, arguing that 
rather than breaking down, the system is undergoing a radical transformation. The 
third and final part explores some specific details concerning the changing nature 
of international politics and attempts at explaining how theoretical approaches and 
concepts converge in order to effectively assess the recognized changes.
Systems and Orders
The very definition of the international system is a problem that has long occupied 
the attention of political scientists. It is, at the beginning, crucially important to 
stress that what is meant by ‘international system’ does not comprise all the sectors 
of international life – however indisputably intertwined they may be. The interna-
tional system is actually the international political system, and this fact, according 
to Waltz (1979: 79), produces certain methodological and epistemological require-
ments:
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To be a success, such a theory2 has to show how international politics can be con-
ceived of as a domain distinct from the economic, social, and other international 
domains that one may conceive of. To mark international-political systems off 
from other international systems, and to distinguish systems-level from unit-level 
forces, requires showing how political structures are generated and how they af-
fect, and are affected by, the units of the system.
In Waltz’s structural realist theory, the notion of international system corres-
ponds to one of structure, which is, along with the system’s units, its constitutive 
element. Waltz defines structure as a ‘system wide component’, which ‘makes it 
possible to think of the system as a whole’ (ibid.). Structure is ‘defined by the ar-
rangement of its parts and comprised of three constitutive elements: ordering prin-
ciple (which, in international politics, is anarchy), the character of the units (states) 
and distribution of capabilities’ (ibid.: 88-101).
The distribution of capabilities is nothing else than the differentiation of states 
according to their power and the possibilities to project it. The outcome of such a 
differentiation is that some units are relatively easily defined as great powers and 
these are the core elements of a system’s polarity. When changes at the systemic 
level of international politics are discussed, it is by definition an issue of changes in 
the system’s polarity (from multipolar, to bipolar, to unipolar). Or, as Waltz (ibid.: 
97) puts it: 
The structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities 
across the system’s units. And changes in structure change expectations about how 
the units of the system will behave and about the outcomes their interactions will 
produce.
This means that polarity is not studied as just one of the random properties 
of the international system, rather, it directly affects the states’ behavior and their 
strategies (Lišanin, 2016: 531-532). In other words, it would be a mistake to assume 
that great power status provides a state with the possibilities of completely uncon-
strained action; rather, it very much limits their maneuvering space (Braumoel-
ler, 2012). According to Mearsheimer, great power status even represents a sort of 
curse, given that great powers are almost never satisfied with the amount of power 
they have, which urges them to engage in perpetual, often brutal competition, thus 
fulfilling the prophecy of the ‘tragedy of great power politics’ (Mearsheimer, 2001). 
Incentives for such behavior come from the level of the international system, and 
specifically, its three main properties:
2 A theory that can successfully explain international-political outcomes (M. L.).
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1) the absence of a central authority that sits above states and can protect them 
from each other, 2) the fact that states always have some offensive military capa-
bility, and 3) the fact that states can never be certain about other states’ intentions 
(ibid.: 3).
There is no doubt that the international system produces consequences obser-
vable at the unit level; behavior or characteristics of units may, in turn, affect the 
nature of the system. But when and how does a system become an order? The tradi-
tional English School concept, put forth by Hedley Bull (2002: 9) and utilized also 
by Trine Flockhart (2016: 12), stipulates that
A system of states (or international system) is formed when two or more states 
have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s 
decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in some measure – as parts of a whole.
In order to form a society, however, being in regular contact and including the 
other in one’s own strategic calculations is not sufficient; the element of a common 
sense of adherence to values is necessary. It is worth quoting Bull’s passage on in-
ternational society in toto: 
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, con-
scious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the 
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their 
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions. If 
states today form an international society (...), this is because, recognising certain 
common interests and perhaps some common values, they regard themselves as 
bound by certain rules in dealings with one another, such as that they should re-
spect one another’s claims to independence, that they should honour agreements 
into which they enter, and that they should be subject to certain limitations in exer-
cising force against one another. At the same time they cooperate in the working 
of institutions such as the forms of procedures of international law, the machinery 
of diplomacy and general international organization, and the customs and conven-
tions of war. 
According to Bull, order can be sustained at the level of the international sys-
tem, international society and the world society (which, aside from being ‘morally 
prior’, is deeper and wider than the international society and remains out of the 
scope of our analysis for this purpose). His definition of order in any social life is 
‘a pattern of human activity that sustains elementary, primary or universal goals of 
social life’, those goals being the physical security of life, adherence to promises 
made, and the stability of property (‘possession of things’) (Bull, 2002: 4). An inter-
national order can thus be defined as ‘a pattern of activity that sustains the elemen-
tary or primary goals of the society of states, or the international society’ (ibid.: 8).
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Trine Flockhart emphasizes an additional and very important distinction, i. e. 
the one 
between order as a condition characterized by the achievement of three funda-
mental goals related to life, truth and property and order as an object constituted 
through a set of activities and practices linked to a specific set of values and insti-
tutions. The latter is what is often described as ‘the international order’, but con-
fusingly it is also functionally equivalent to Bull’s key concept – ‘international 
society’. The problem is that the concepts of ‘order’, ‘international order’ and ‘in-
ternational society’ are difficult to separate, and the focus of the current debate on 
‘the international order’ appears to actually be about changes in the ‘international 
system’ – albeit without a clear distinction being offered between system, society 
and order. 
Although it is stated that there are three different levels upon which order can 
be traced, ‘it is clear that Bull thought that order would most likely be produced at 
the international society level’ (Flockhart, 2016: 13). Being founded upon a sense 
of common interests, order needs rules and institutions to come to life. In sustaining 
the three primary goals of social life, order is predominantly (re)produced through 
five ‘primary institutions’ of international society (Bull, 2002: 62-71, 97-222): the 
balance of power, international law, the diplomatic mechanism, the managerial sys-
tem of the great powers, and war. Instead of representing formal institutions, such as 
international organizations (those would be ‘secondary institutions’), these are ‘an 
expression of the element of collaboration among states in discharging their politi-
cal functions – and at the same time a means of sustaining this collaboration’ (ibid.: 
71). Also, Bull’s identification of institutions that sustain the international order is a 
good illustration of the reason the English School is sometimes called ‘liberal real-
ism’: some important concepts from both liberal and realist theory are represented.
It is clear that Bull’s notion of international society very much corresponds to 
the phenomenon of a ‘liberal international order’. Flockhart resolves the tension 
between order as a condition and order as an object by stating that ‘the condition 
of order as the achievement of the three fundamental goals is to be found through 
the object as in the international order’ (Flockhart, 2016: 13). As it was mentioned 
earlier, whether such an order is sometimes deservedly rendered the ‘global liberal 
order’, or ‘world liberal order’, even in the era and context of the Washington Con-
sensus, is, of course, highly debatable. It is not an issue of a binary model, either 
the presence or absence of order, as Lake (2014: 61) stipulates when he argues that
Order is a fundamental feature of world politics, but it is not a constant. It waxes 
and wanes with corresponding ebbs and flows, yet not in any predictable lunar 
cycle.
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Rather, the issue is a possibility of simultaneous existence of a multiplicity of 
international orders, regardless of whether or not they constitute a more general 
world order (Kissinger, 2014). This enables us to make a distinction not only be-
tween system breakdown and transformation, but also between system-based and 
order-based inquiries and analyses of world politics.
The Changing Nature of International Politics: 
A New World Disorder or a Multi-Order World?
Koivisto and Dunne (2010: 620) are correct when they argue that there are two pre-
dominant accounts of the liberal order’s crisis: ‘one suggesting the crisis is one of 
US-led post-war international order, the other unpacking the crisis as a legitima-
tion crisis of the deeper institutions of contemporary international society’. Some 
of those accounts were mentioned in the introductory section. However, two im-
portant remarks must be made: one, the debates about the crisis of international or-
der (often mistaken for the global order) largely correspond with the views of the 
institutional legitimation crisis; and two, accounts of the crisis of American power 
and US-led international order are much closer to debates on the crisis of the inter-
national system (although the legitimacy dimension is not automatically excluded 
from this perspective).
This is important because, having this distinction in mind, it is easier to esti-
mate whether there is a crisis or breakdown of the international order, or it is all 
about the ill-perceived transformation of the international system (i.e. its polarity). 
After all, in spite of all the turbulence in contemporary world politics, it can hardly 
be disputed that the world is safer and richer today than it has ever been. The trends, 
negative developments, the potential for an actual breakdown is what actually in-
cites premature declarations of an actual collapse (Haass, 2017).
Whether perceived as a crisis of the international liberal order’s legitimacy, or 
the crisis of power among its main proponents (most notably, the US), the current 
global turbulence can be viewed through the inability of the order’s mechanisms to 
deal with the challenges that hamper its survival. Almost every major crisis since 
the onset of the twenty first century, from the global war on terror, to the global 
financial crisis, to the Arab Spring, can be used as a showcase in this context. It 
has also been wrongly claimed, within the academia, as well as the policy commu-
nity, that the main concepts of the liberal order are in fact, or soon will be, global 
in scope: one such example is Iraq since 2003, as ‘a war of liberal hubris’, waged 
on the ‘false premise of universal desirability of liberal values’ (Kitchen and Cox, 
2011: 82).
All of this, along with the rise of populism and the return of identity politics 
(Brexit and Donald Trump’s election win being symbols of the trend), strengthens 
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Kissinger’s bluntly put claim that ‘no truly global “world order” has ever existed’ 
(Kissinger, 2014: 2). Thus, the ‘liberal world order’ has not broken down, but sig-
nificant changes within particular international orders, as well as transformation of 
the overall structure of the international system are undoubtedly present.
Such turbulence produces, and is in turn itself produced by, some very specific 
changes in the main concepts of international social life. The aforementioned re-
emergence of identity politics has fortified the position of the nation state as an ac-
tor: to speak in a Wendtian manner, identities and interests of actors are being (re)
constructed under systemic-level influences (Wendt, 1999). This, in turn, reinvi-
gorates the issue of Westphalian type state sovereignty, thus exposing liberalism’s 
inherent ambivalence towards the issue of sovereignty (Ikenberry, 2011: 289-290); 
or, to summon another classical author, regarding issues of state sovereignty, in the 
environment of the international system, purpose beats rules and ‘the logics of con-
sequences dominate the logics of appropriateness’ (Krasner, 1999: 6).
At the system level, it is clear that the role of the previously hegemonic actor is 
diminishing, whether by choice or by external forces of the environment. In that con-
text, and bearing in mind clearly the re-emerging significance of a number of units, 
almost all actors of significance become, to some extent, revisionist (Schweller, 
1994; Lišanin, 2014: 452-454) – their interests are systemically shaped that way. 
That is why system units seem, and often in fact are, more conflict-prone than 
they have been in the recent past. In addition, the crisis of order legitimacy influ-
ences the framework of international cooperation: multilateral political, economic 
and security regimes seem to retrench in importance, and give way to traditional 
bilateral diplomacy or great-power-concert-like arrangements.
Along with deep political changes in the US, and perhaps even deeper crisis in 
the EU, Chinese economic and Russian military assertiveness, as well as the Middle 
Eastern collapse, seem to perfectly encapsulate all the presented changes. Differ-
ent orders are produced and sustained on the basis of systemically shaped identities 
and interests. According to Kissinger, four distinct, competing notions of order are 
traceable in a historical perspective: European-Westphalian, Chinese, Islamic and 
American (Kissinger, 2014) now exist simultaneously. This means that, apart from 
rival states, the world also contains rival, culture-historically founded orders. Even 
though Huntington’s bleak predictions regarding the relations of such civilizational 
clusters have not been fulfilled, it is obvious that the world is in flux and that cul-
tural differentiations play a role in this process. Does this produce adequate flux in 
the field of international theory?
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Converging Theories
According to Flockhart (2016: 14), 
In its most basic form an international society – or an international order – may 
be understood as a cluster (or club) of sovereign states or nations with shared va-
lues, norms and interests, expressed through a number of institutions both primary 
ones that are informal and evolved (rather than designed) and performed through 
fundamental and durable shared practices and secondary ones that are formal and 
designed and which perform specific administrative and regulative functions.
In addition to primary and secondary institutions, an international order also 
rests upon elements of sovereignty/power (intrinsic to a state-based society) and 
identity, as a foundation of internal cohesion. Presented graphically, it would look 
like this:
Figure 1. The Ideal Type of International Society (Flockhart, 2016: 15).
Flockhart also argues that ‘it is difficult to imagine an international system that 
is not characterized by at least a minimum degree of social relations and that an in-
ternational system therefore is likely to have some social attributes that are likely 
to be similar to those in an international society’ (ibid.: 17). She then proceeds to 
present some previous types of international systems, before pointing out that the 
latest transformation has brought about an essentially novel system: a system of or-
ders, or a multi-order world (Figure 2 on the next page). The main issue regarding 
prospects in world politics is thus a possibility of the coexistence of orders within 
such a system, given that ‘the primary dynamics are likely to be within and between 
different orders, rather than between multiple sovereign states’ (ibid.: 23). So, the 
states remain primary actors of international politics, but their interests are medi-
ated through an international, sub-global order they belong to.
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Figure 2. Varieties of International Systems (Flockhart, 2016: 19).
Primary concern regarding the future of such an order is whether the dynamics 
will dominantly be sustained by identity, or by regions, i.e. geographic proximity. 
Flockhart argues that identity will represent the primary drive, while Henry Kis-
singer (2014: 371) stresses different fears – that failing to reconstruct the overall 
international system might result in a violent struggle among various identity-em-
bedded but regionally-based orders:
The penalty for failing will be not so much a major war between states (though in 
some regions this is not foreclosed) as an evolution into spheres of influence iden-
tified with particular domestic structures and forms of governance – for example, 
the Westphalian model as against the radical Islamist version. At its edges each 
sphere would be tempted to test its strength against other entities of orders deemed 
illegitimate. They would be networked for instantaneous communication and im-
pinging on one another constantly. In time the tensions of this process would de-
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generate into maneuvers for status or advantage on a continental scale or even 
worldwide. A struggle between regions could be even more debilitating than the 
struggle between nations has been.
The contemporary quest for world order will require a coherent strategy to es-
tablish a concept of order within the various regions, and to relate these regional 
orders to one another. These goals are not necessarily identical or self-reconciling: 
the triumph of a radical movement might bring order to one region while setting 
the stage for turmoil in and with all others. The domination of a region by one 
country militarily, even if it brings the appearance of order, could produce a crisis 
for the rest of the world.
There are, of course, somewhat different assessments of the state of the inter-
national system. According to Schweller (2010: 147), for instance, the system was, 
in 2010, still unipolar, which, due to specificities of the unipole’s position, made 
polarity centered analysis somewhat meaningless:
What may be more important than polarity is the increase in the number and kinds 
of state and nonstate actors that can affect the system’s outcomes. That is to say, 
the system’s process variables, not its structure, may be driving the current dy-
namics of world politics.
It is precisely this increase in the number of state actors that coincides with 
the system’s apparent turn to multipolarity. In Schweller’s opinion (ibid.: 153-160), 
there might be two potential roads to multipolarity: 
(1) contenders for polar status deliberately undermine the current order and then 
replace it with a new one by means of balancing behavior; or
(2) a spontaneously generated equilibrium develops not from balancing behavior 
but from uneven rates of growth among egoistic actors seeking wealth, not power.
It may well be argued that both of those cases might occur, or even are oc-
curring, within different sub-global orders, and that Schweller’s notion of ‘road to 
multipolarity’ largely corresponds to the idea of ‘the coming multi-order world’.
Does the discipline of International Relations actually have the necessary tools 
to adequately grasp these processes? In the context of what seems to be a radical 
transformation within the very core of international politics, international theory is 
often deemed impotent; this being a result precisely of the contemporary lack of in-
terest in the nature of politics, or, as Reus-Smit (2012: 534-535) puts it:
By our own declaration, we are students of ‘global politics’ as much as interna-
tional relations. Yet our embrace of the global has been matched by a declining in-
terest in the political. The number of books and articles published in IR increases 
every year, and these are peppered with references to ‘political’ practices, ‘politi-
cal’ institutions, ‘political’ actors, ‘political’ power and the ‘political’ realm. One 
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struggles to find IR scholars discussing the nature of politics, however. Like the 
concept of power, we use the terminology constantly while seldom probing its 
meaning.
Reus-Smit considers this problem in the context of frequent accusations that 
IR theory is ‘practically irrelevant’. But it can also be observed in the context of our 
analysis of whether analytical tools of contemporary international theory (or, per-
haps, multiple theories) are sufficient to cope with issues of turbulences in present-
day international system.
It is the argument of this paper that analytic apparatuses of traditional IR para-
digms are mostly not sufficient if one wants to grasp the realities of the coming 
multi-order world. This is due to the fact that 1) traditional paradigms are built on 
different levels of inquiry (e.g. epistemology vs. ontology), and, perhaps more im-
portantly, 2) they are, thus, oriented toward different elements of international so-
cial life, all of which might prove crucial for successful research. 
As the international system changes, so do the tools for its assessment. One 
way of conducting such a change is for each theory to sharpen its own research 
tools by devising additional hypotheses in response to new empirical challenges, 
while conserving the theoretical “hard core”, i. e. the set of its main assumptions 
– in Lakatosian terms, this would represent an intra-paradigmatic problemshift.3 
Another way is to alter the very core of the theory, thus changing its very nature 
to the extent that it becomes something genuinely new (inter-paradigmatic shift). 
Leaving aside that, according to Lakatos, such changes can be made for the pur-
pose of ad hoc repair of a paradigm, which would make the shift “degenerative”, it 
is only logical that, in the context of said systemic changes, traditional approaches 
might converge, thus creating hybrid paradigms or theories that are more suitable 
for responding to the challenges of contemporary international politics. The English 
School approach,4 as represented by Hedley Bull, but also a number of contempo-
rary thinkers including Tim Dunne, is such a hybrid approach in and of itself, given 
that it combines crucial concepts from both realist and liberal traditions – which is 
clearly illustrated, for instance, by Bull’s notion of primary institutions that sustain 
international order.
Another widely employed approach which can be considered at least methodo-
logically – but also, arguably, epistemologically innovative, is neoclassical realism. 
It can be contended that its attempt to surmount the traditional innenpolitik/foreign 
policy duality represents a qualitative leap that goes beyond mere reconceptualiza-
3 See: Lakatos, 1989; for a wider appraisal of the discipline from the Lakatosian perspective, 
see: Elman and Elman, 2003.
4 See: Dunne, 1998.
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tion of realism’s core concepts. But an even more potent hybrid might be the one 
created by the crossing of realism and constructivism, often a priori rejected due to 
the approaches’ prima facie incompatibility. Claims of incompatibility come from 
both camps, and are supported by dubious arguments (Barkin, 2003: 326):
Claims by constructivists that realist theory is incompatible with intersubjective 
epistemologies and methodologies are based on either caricatures or very narrow 
understandings of realism. And realist critics of constructivism are similarly guilty 
of inferring from the worldviews of some (perhaps many) practicing constructi-
vists that the methodology is inherently biased toward liberalism. An examination 
of constructivist epistemology and classical realist theory suggests that they are, 
in fact, compatible; not, of course, that good constructivism is necessarily realist, 
but that constructivist research is as compatible with a realist worldview as with 
any other.
Given that constructivism, in this context, is not considered an IR theory in the 
same way that realism is, what looks as a point of incompatibility actually provides 
an opportunity for a kind of social-scientific merger: the result being a theory that 
would rest upon realist assumptions on how the world works and constructivist as-
sumptions on how best to study the ways the world works. As Brown (2013: 490) 
puts it:
It is, I hope, clear that constructivism is not a theory of IR in the sense that libe-
ralism and realism are theories of IR – rather, it is a set of dispositions towards 
social reality that lead to placing more emphasis on ideas, values, norms and prac-
tices than is the case with both rational choice and structuralist theories. The role 
of theory here is rather different from that of its role in liberalism or realism, for 
example – much more to do with identifying areas for research than with develop-
ing explanatory concepts.
To go back to Barkin’s aforementioned stance, this would mean: to utilize a 
constructivist methodology to study realism-identified issues; or, to put it the other 
way around, to fill constructivist epistemological construction with realist sub-
stance. After all, constructivism, especially in its “soft” or “moderate” form, exem-
plified by Alexander Wendt, can inherently be understood as either a refinement of 
Waltzian realism, or as a via media between realist and more radical constructivist 
approaches (Popović, 2016: 94-104, 104-107). Nonetheless, in order for such a bold 
theoretical endeavor to be fulfilled, one must ‘move beyond’ the traditional ratio-
nalist-constructivist debate (Jackson and Nexon, 2013: 555-556):
Some difficulties stem from the inherent limitations of positing a critical intellec-
tual opposition between ‘rationalist’ and ‘constructivist’ theories. Rationalism is 
generally compatible with claims that significant aspects of political life are so-
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cially and historically contingent rather than ‘determined by the nature of things’. 
But the opposition of rationalism to constructivism follows only from a very nar-
row reading of rationalism: as a claim that the decision-making procedures that 
drive human choices are both invariant and also structured by unmediated and 
objective features of the world.
This could be achieved by adopting the stance that Hans Mouritzen (2017) 
calls compatibilism: as opposed to perspectivism, which encloses perspectives en-
tirely within their own understanding of the world, thus making any paradigmatic 
integration impossible, it ‘holds that the perspectives should – for explanatory pur-
poses – be made compatible by the conscious effort of the analyst’. In this sense, 
compatibility means that theoretical approaches ‘should be mutually competitive, 
possibly offering contradictory real-world predictions, but (in some cases) ultimate-
ly supplementing one another in a specific explanation’ (Mouritzen, 2017: 633). 
The main perspectives usually seen as almost or completely incompatible are real-
ism and constructivism, but the difference between perspectivism and compatibi-
lism is what is really important; especially given that it has roots in their epistemo-
logical discrepancies. Namely, Mouritzen states that the issue with perspectivism 
is that it is based on epistemological idealism, which means that ‘there is no reality 
existing independently from the models and hence no neutral ground outside them’ 
(ibid.: 646); at the same time, compatibilism is rooted in epistemological/ontic real-
ism, meaning that there is an “outside” reality, existing separately from theoretical 
models, with “truth” representing correspondence between the two. 
According to Mouritzen, realism is much more adequate for the act of ‘bor-
rowing’ from other perspectives than, for instance, liberalism. Neoclassical realism, 
with its endorsement of unit-level variables in providing explanations and predic-
tions (cf. Ripsman et al., 2016), thus represents a good example of compatibilist 
design, and Mouritzen demonstrates this by attempting to explain the difference be-
tween German and Swedish answers to the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. 
The way he does this is by employing the geopolitical perspective (‘realism with a 
map’) while borrowing from the constructivist perspective of ‘lessons of the past’. 
His goal is not to fully integrate the theories, or blend their epistemologies, but to 
show how elements from one can be borrowed by the other, provided that this is 
conducted on the same explanatory level.
Suggested ‘wider’ reading of both rationalist (in this case: realist) and con-
structivist approaches should come about within a more general process of intro-
ducing ‘integrative pluralism’ to the field of IR theorizing, as suggested by Dunne 
et al. (2013: 416-417), which ‘accepts and preserves the validity of a wide range of 
theoretical perspectives and embraces theoretical diversity as a means of provid-
ing more comprehensive and multi dimensional accounts of complex phenomena’.
Lišanin, M., Possibilities of Assessing the Changing Nature of International Politics...
157
That way, a prospect for forging more potent, hybrid approaches to studies 
of world politics could emerge. Diverse features of the coming multi-order world 
seem to particularly incite such a development. A realist brand of constructivism, 
proposed by Barkin (2003: 338), could that way 
study the relationship between normative structures, the carriers of political mo-
rality, and uses of power. And, as a result, realist constructivism could address is-
sues of change in international relations in a way that neither idealist constructiv-
ism (with its ultimately static view of political morality) nor positivist-materialist 
realism (with its dismissive view of political morality) can manage. In doing so, 
a realist constructivism could fill a gap in theorizing in IR between mainstream 
theorizing and critical theory.
A particularly ambitious effort is made by Gallarotti, with the development of 
the concept of ‘cosmopolitan power’ as a tool for analyzing the power dynamics of 
the contemporary world (Gallarotti, 2010). His goal is to cross paradigmatic boun-
daries by synthesizing realism, neoliberalism and constructivism in order to pro-
duce a theory of power optimization. His effort is all the more enthusiastic given 
that it is precisely the issue of power that dominates most of the theoretical misun-
derstandings among the three; but it seems largely successful. He begins by map-
ping the soft power concept in “less likely places” – the great texts of realism, only 
to develop the concept of cosmopolitan power, whose logic ‘suggests that norms 
and cooperation [...] can function as instruments of national power’ (ibid.: 268), be-
fore demonstrating the way this works through case studies.
Both Mouritzen’s idea of compatibilist borrowing and Gallarotti’s effort to 
synthesize various paradigms (and this also goes for other similar attempts) demand 
that we dispose of excessive theoretical rigidity, in the form of Mouritzen’s perspec-
tivism or Schweller’s paradigmatism (Schweller, 2003). This does not imply that 
the old, existing theories and paradigms should be disposed of, or that their con-
vergence should inevitably lead to completely new forms of explanatory tools. At 
the same time, the process of improving theories should not lead to non-systematic 
ad-hocery, which would explain away all empirical aberrations while completely 
disfiguring original theories and their instruments. Theories, approaches and para-
digms could use the current state of theoretical peace (Dunne et al., 2013) to lock 
themselves even tighter within their own domains, or to initiate the process of their 
improvement by integrating the elements that prove to be explanatorily compatible. 
The second scenario is, luckily, advocated by a growing number of members of the 
academic community. This is, undoubtedly, a complicated and audacious theoreti-
cal undertaking. But it might prove to be exactly what contemporary international 
relations, and International Relations, desperately need.
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